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Realist history does not meet many
human needs.  History needs a great
deal more philosophy, but of what
kind?
In his essay on this blog, „Reflections on
Theory of History Polyphonic,” Ethan
Kleinberg suggests that historians often
use theory to block change in their
work rather than to advance it. One
way they do this, he points out, is to
include a little theory in order to
inoculate themselves against greater
and more fundamental challenges.
They give or take a blow, and then hoist
up their shield, thereby avoiding
philosophy and miniaturizing it into
„historical theory.”
I cannot quantify the resistance that
professional historians have shown
toward changes of the sort Kleinberg
argues for, nor can I add much to a
psychology of such defensive
Prévosteau, 1597). historiography. Some historians just
avoid philosophy because it’s neither
their job, nor their skill, nor their disposition; some have superseding intellectual or
moral commitments. Many people from all walks of life simply do not want to be
discomfited. As a disciplined young engineer, John Muir was building a clock when a
spring in the mechanism popped him in the eyes, temporarily blinding him. While lying
in a darkened room for months awaiting the return of his sight, a new vision opened
up before him, and he subsequently became one of the great wanderers in American
life. Some are clockmakers, some wanderers; most of us try to do our duty while
leaving ourselves a certain measure of freedom. Yet good historians are not drudges,
as they are highly aware of the complex constitution of any given state of human
affairs.
I am more interested in why philosophy avoids history. Is it because of what
philosophers do and the way they do it? And what is it that philosophers do that
allows some historians to use slivers of conceptual thought to blot out the rest? The
almost-forgotten philosopher of history, John W. Miller, said, „To view history
philosophically is to consider it as a constitutional mode of experience”1 It seems to
me that the dereliction of the vast existential import of the historical is a great loss. I
would like to explore this by commenting on two of Kleinberg’s propositions, in order to
argue that understanding history non-realistically provides conceptual strength and
ethical values for moral and general philosophy, as well as for human understanding.
1. Ontological blind spots
„II.5. Even perspectivalism adheres to the monophonic regime because it is a
proliferation of sanctioned and restrictive choices or points of view. It is talking over
rather than listening.”
In a recent essay, Thomas Mercier went straight to the heart of this problem:
In other words, claiming to sidestep all the problems related to ‚language’ and
‚epistemology’ by recurring to ‚ontology’ can only result in absolutizing a certain
‚language’ and ‚epistemology’, thus blinding ontology to its own epistemic or linguistic
(performative) violence. It cannot think its own violence, that is, the performative
violence of ontological sovereignty, wherein ontology, epistemology and politics
become indistinguishable…. Pluralizing presence merely confirms the metaphysics of
presence.2
Each domain in pluralist ontology, as now generally developed, must hold its own
against the others in order to ensure that it is not blurred into someone else’s monism
or dualism. Each one is a monad whose integrity limits connectedness. As a result,
and despite the aims of its advocates, pluralism often stands in opposition to
relationality. This problem is especially severe in object-oriented ontology.
As a pluralist ontology, perspectivalism in empirical research uses non-perspectival
rationalism in the construction of each perspective. It aims to create pictures that are
round and complete through a neutral standard of verification. But the
presuppositions of verification—even in the sciences—are undergoing epochal
change. The historical perspective required by understanding thus remains a stretch
for much of philosophy, even in philosophy of science.
2. Analytical bottlenecks
„III.4. Currently, the field of philosophy of history is occupied by very few practicing
philosophers aligned for the most part with the analytic tradition. Their concerns seem
to be more with understanding the rules or laws regarding what historians do rather
than what history or the past is. Its relation to history and historians is similar to the
one Husserl identified between the philosophy of science and the practices of
scientists.”
Anglo-American analytic philosophy has a complicated relationship with moral and
political philosophy, but it is safe to say that analytic philosophy avoids prescriptive
claims in these areas. Analytic philosophers also avoid politics and ethics in
conceptions of their work. There is of course analytic work in ethics, but one of its chief
characteristics is rigid avoidance of diachronesis and historical understanding more
generally.
This is partly due to how the analytic tradition approaches the problem of time. It has
produced a large body of theories on this topic that essentially cannot be applied to
questions of historical and social change. However, philosophy has a body of
phenomenological and existential thinking on time, which began with Brentano and
was expanded by Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, and others. These thinkers realized
from the start that time shows us relationality3 This anti-realism and anti-objectivism
was at least as important in the process of philosophy beginning with Bergson’s basic
concept, because it eventually formed a building block of non-reductive scientific
theory as well as of philosophy and history of science. In addition, there is a vast body
of reflection on temporality, which is one of the great streams of modern culture. Still,
only a few academic philosophers of history have engaged with this.
3. The problem: realists reify
Ontological realism still holds out in many quarters of „historical theory” against theory
or philosophy of history, to use Kleinberg’s terms for the scientistic position and the
many kinds of philosophy I mentioned in the previous paragraph. We can put the
problem in the following manner: the realists see history and the human sciences as
requiring a scientific method (as currently conceived in the dominant paradigm of
science), whereas anti-realists reject this as alienated. The former position is—or
seems to be—clear, precise, and stable. The latter is multiform because it can go in
many directions, from mystical to Marxist, thereby arousing the realist’s suspicion.
Leaving aside the difficulties of the correspondence theories of truth on which realism
typically relies, the problem of most concern here is that it will not recognize any
experience of—or relation to—history that is not the object of empirical cognition, the
sort of thing that the word historicity was originally invented to designate.4
This is a problem because the position of the detached observer of objects of
cognition does not recognize herself as a participant in history. Yet we are both the
subjects and objects of history. We cannot have any ethical notion of history that
replaces our responsibility for making history with our cognition of history, nor for
making the world with our bare knowledge of history. By not taking any of the
available routes out of the subject-object binary, realist historiography takes human
behavior and society to be directed by nature. The realist reifies nature, so that all
human arrangements are under the control of “nature.” This casts both the past and
nature as a kind of “reality” that suppresses its unique affective, ontological, and
moral features. It detaches our actions from our persons; this is good neither for
historians nor humankind.
4. Opening up history improves us
Realist ontology takes the desire of rational wholes that is part of our mental
equipment past the point of truth or utility. Realist historiography tends to dislike the
wandering story because it seeks the causal and linear mechanisms in the stories it
tells. It prefers clockmakers to wanderers, yet what we need is more wandering and
more interdisciplinarity.
Can the ground of normativity for the values we apply to facts be natural in the way
that facts are purported to be natural? If not, then we must admit into the practice of
history—and of the sciences and our lives in general—non-realist types of knowledge
or modes of reasoning that are social, political, and moral. Facts and values are
always mixed together because we have no God-like method of (or standpoint for)
verification. Every system of verification is a social product, agreed upon for
pragmatic reasons that can and will change. Should we not hold that non-realism
has the resources to support a combination of factual and moral claims that realism
does not possess?
Another dimension should supersede this ontological strife. That dimension is the
moral, which requires a different discourse, one that is by necessity strongly marked
by non-realist elements, including the whole range of our moral dispositions and
political theories excluded by ontologically realist history and philosophy. It is precisely
because scientific and all other views must be historicized that real philosophy of
history can expand moral philosophy and include it within historiography.
This problem recounts the story of a century of philosophy. History should be at the
center of it. Kleinberg is encouraging us to continue pursuing the path of intellectual
and social progress, from which realism would hold us back.
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